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1. Introduction
Many European sports are organized according to the principles of the
so-called “European model of sport”. One such principle is that sport is
organized on a national basis with one – and only one – governing body per
nation and sport, which is exclusively responsible for the organization of its
respective sport within that national territory.1 This organizational principle
reveals and strengthens the national character of sport – a character that is
reflected in the importance attached to national competitions, national
championships, and competitions between national teams. To preserve this
national character, it is common for sports governing bodies to restrict access
of non-nationals to national sporting events.2
These characteristics of sport are fundamentally at odds with the principles
of the European Union. The EU is organized around the achievement of free
movement between Member States and this includes, in particular, the
abolition of discrimination on grounds of nationality.3 Hence, there is tension
between sport’s demands to organize its affairs along national lines and the
requirements of EU law: to what extent should EU law recognize the
specificity and autonomy of sport, and what are the boundaries of sporting
self-regulation?
These questions have generated much academic literature4 and an
ever-expanding body of EU jurisprudence and Commission decisional
1. Commission Communication, “White Paper on Sport”, COM(2007)391 final, p. 13.
2. The extent of this practice in European sport was revealed in a study funded by the
European Commission in 2010: “Study on the equal treatment of non-nationals in individual
sports competitions”, (T.M.C. Asser Instituut, Edge Hill University and Leiden University,
2010).
3. Art. 18 TFEU.
4. See e.g. Parrish, Sports Law and Policy in the European Union (Manchester University
Press, 2003);Van den Bogaert,Practical Regulation of theMobility of Sportsmen in the EUPost
Bosman (Kluwer Law International, 2005); Parrish and Miettinen, The Sporting Exception in
European Union Law (T.M.C. Asser Press, 2008); Pijetlovic, EU Sports Law and Breakaway
Common Market Law Review 57: 1–22, 2020.
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practice that centres around the role of sport in the achievement of the internal
market – “an area without internal frontiers” for the economically active.5 The
picture in modern professional sport appeared to be relatively clear: “sport is
subject to Community law only in so far as it constitutes an economic
activity”6 and EU law does not touch on nationality-based rules for selection
to national teams7. Nationality discrimination in professional club sport is
incompatible with the Treaty unless justified8 and, following Meca-Medina,
some nationality-based rules could, in principle, escape classification as a
restriction as they are inherent in the pursuit of a legitimate sporting
objective.9 This has given rise to a well-founded impression that invoking EU
law in a sporting context requires some modicum of economic nexus and that
EU law cannot be invoked in “pure” amateur sport.
In retrospect, this appears to be less obvious. In 1993 the Maastricht Treaty
established Union citizenship for every Member State national.10 The
significance of this became clear, if it had not been before, when the ECJ
declared in Grzelczyk that “Union citizenship is destined to be the
fundamental status of nationals of the Member States”.11 As a result, it is
well-established that every Union citizen enjoys and can directly rely on the
Treaty-based right to reside in any Member State regardless of whether he or
she is economically active.12
How should these doctrines of Union law be reconciled? Can Union
citizens rely upon their citizenship rights against private actors such as sports
governing bodies, i.e. does Union citizenship enjoy horizontal direct effect?
And if so, to what extent can direct discrimination on the grounds of
nationality be justified considering conditions particular to the area of sport?
These were the questions facing the ECJ in TopFit.
Leagues in Football (Springer, 2015); Duval and Van Rompuy (Eds.), The Legacy of Bosman
(Springer, 2016); and Weatherill, Principles and Practice in EU Sports Law (OUP, 2017).
5. Art. 26(2) TFEU.
6. Case C-36/74, Walrave and Koch, EU:C:1974:140, para 4, and Case C-415/93, Union
Royale Belge Sociétés de Football Association and others v. Bosman and others,
EU:C:1995:463, para 73.
7. Case C-36/74,Walrave and Koch.
8. Case C-415/93, Bosman, EU:C:1995:463.
9. Case C-519/04 P,Meca-Medina and Macjen v. Commission, EU:C:2006:492.
10. Art. 20(1) TFEU.
11. Case C-184/99, Grzelczyk v. Centre public d’aide sociale d’Ottignies-Louvain-
la-Neuve, EU:C:2001:458, para 31.
12. Case C-413/99, Baumbast and R. v. Secretary of State for the Home Department,
EU:C:2002:493, paras. 82–84.
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2. Factual and legal background
Daniele Biffi is an Italian national and Union citizen who has lived in
Germany for a number of years. As a member of German athletics club
TopFit, he competed for the title of “national champion” in the amateur senior
German championships, organized by the German Athletics Association. His
placings were recorded and he used his results to advertise his business as an
athletics coach and personal trainer.
A rule change promulgated by the German Athletics Association in 2016
meant that non-nationals, such as Mr Biffi, were as a general rule excluded
from participating in the national championship. Non-nationals could apply
for an exception, but only to participate without classification, meaning that
participation was restricted to the first round of a running competition or in
the first three attempts of a technical competition. Indeed, in the German
national championships in Zittau, Mr Biffi placed third in the 100m heats, but
was prevented from running in the final even though he should have qualified
based on his performance.
Mr Biffi objected on the grounds that as a non-national, he could not
compete in the German national championships on the same basis as those
athletes with German nationality. This could result in him receiving less
support from his athletics club given that he would be fully or partially
excluded from involvement in the national championships, thus making
investing in him less attractive. Consequently, Mr Biffi would be less able to
integrate at the sports club to which he is affiliated and, therefore, in the
society of the Member State where he is resident. Such treatment could also
have a damaging effect on his business as he cited his athletics prowess to
advertise his services.
In the German court, Mr Biffi cited an alleged infringement of EU law, a
claim rebuffed by the German Athletics Association on the grounds that as he
was an amateur athlete, no economic activity was being carried out and, as per
paragraph 4 ofWalrave and Koch, EU law does not apply. The referring court
was not clear on whether the application of EU law to sport is always subject
to the exercise of economic activity, particularly since the advent of EU
citizenship rights and the entry into force of Article 165 TFEU in 2009, both
provisions which are not dependent on the existence of economic activity.
Consequently, the court made a reference to the ECJ regarding the
interpretation of Articles 18, 21 and 165 TFEU.
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3. The Opinion of theAdvocate General
Advocate General Tanchev was opposed to “[e]xpanding the material scope
of EU law” by givingArticle 21TFEU horizontal direct effect.To that end, and
contrary to the national court’s question and assessment of the facts, the
Advocate General approached the situation as a restriction of the economic
freedom of establishment under Article 49 TFEU. That move reflected the
orthodoxy of how EU sports law has, to date, largely developed, which is on
the basis of individuals connecting defence of their EU rights to the pursuit of
economic activity. This has presented itself either in the context of disputes
involving workers with employment contracts or those athletes providing
sporting services.13
Since Mr Biffi used his performance in amateur competitions to advance
his business interests as a coach and personal trainer, the Advocate General
claimed that “Mr Biffi cannot be regarded as an ‘amateur’ sportsman”.14
Consequently, the discrimination he suffered in breach of Article 18 TFEU
falls within the scope of the Treaty by virtue of Article 49 TFEU.15 In short,
Mr Biffi’s economic activity was the gateway to the Treaty prohibitions on
nationality discrimination. Thus, the Advocate General proposed that the ECJ
should rule that the measure in question constituted a violation of the
prohibition against discrimination under the freedom of establishment.
However, if the Court chose not to answer the question using Article 49
TFEU, the Advocate General believed that Union law was not applicable in
the case. Whilst the Advocate General could not deny that the Court had
already severed the link between migration and economic activity,16 he
declined to take the “significant constitutional step” of expanding the Court’s
case law on Article 21 to extend its effect to the horizontal relationship
between private parties17 – the open-ended nature of which makes it a poor
candidate for horizontal direct effect.18 The Advocate General therefore
argued that sports can only be affected by EU law either through the exercise
13. For workers see Case C-415/93, Bosman; for the self-employed see Joined Cases
C-51/96 & 191/97, Deliège v. Ligue francophone de judo et disciplines associées ASBL, Ligue
belge de judo ASBL, Union européenne de judo (C-51/96) and Pacquée (C-191/97), EU:C:
2000:199.
14. Opinion of A.G. Tanchev in Case C-22/18, TopFit, EU:C:2019:181, para 51.
15. Ibid., para 56.
16. In Case C-413/99, Baumbast, the ECJ stated that “the Treaty on European Union does
not require that citizens of the Union pursue a professional or trade activity, whether as an
employed or self-employed person, in order to enjoy the rights provided in Part Two [TFEU], on
citizenship of the Union”.
17. Opinion, para 56.
18. Ibid., para 105.
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of freedom of movement or through specific measures, such as those adopted
under Article 165 TFEU.19
4. Judgment of the Court of Justice
The ECJ noted that Mr Biffi had already exercised his right to free movement
under Article 21 TFEU, as he had resided in Germany for 15 years.20 It also
repeated the above-cited mantra in Grzelczyk.21 Having exercised his right to
free movement, Mr Biffi is also protected by Article 18 TFEU governing
non-discrimination on the grounds of nationality. It follows from the Court’s
case law that economically active individuals who exercise freedom of
movement have a corollary right to access leisure activities available in the
Member State of residence.22 Union citizenship, under Article 21 TFEU and
secondary acts, subsequently provided access to such “social advantages”23
independent of economic activity – advantages that are important to facilitate
a non-national’s integration into the society of the host State.24
The ECJ went on to say that Article 165 TFEU strengthens this position by
reflecting the considerable social importance of sport – a characteristic
already acknowledged by the Member States in the 1997 Amsterdam
Declaration on Sport25 and by the Court itself in its sports-related case law.
Therefore, taken together, Articles 21 and 165 TFEU allow an EU citizen who
is residing in another Member State to “create bonds with the society of the
State to which he has moved and in which he is residing or to consolidate
them”.26 In the context of those non-nationals wishing to practise amateur
sport, the Court therefore effectively established the principle that such
sporting competitions should be open access.
But who should ensure this open access and can sports bodies derogate
from this principle? On the first question, the ECJ diverged from the Advocate
General’s Opinion. It noted settled case law, particularly in the area of sport, to
the effect that observance of the fundamental freedoms and the prohibition of
nationality discrimination apply not only to rules which are of a public nature,
19. Ibid., para 110.
20. Judgment, para 27.
21. Ibid., para 28, citing Case C-184/99, Grzelczyk.
22. Case C-334/94, Commission v. France, EU:C:1996:90, paras. 21–23.
23. Art. 7(2) of Regulation 492/2011 on freedom of movement for workers within the
Union refers to “Social and Tax Advantages”.
24. See Case C-165/16, Lounes v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, EU:C:
2017:862.
25. Declaration No. 29 on sport annexed to the Final Act of the conference which adopted
the text of the Treaty of Amsterdam.
26. Judgment, para 34.
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but also to rules of a private nature that are aimed at regulating gainful
employment and the provision of services in a collective manner as not doing
so would compromise the ability to exercise those rights. After restating its
case law on the scope of rights based on economic activity, the Court
concluded that the rights of non-economically active individuals under
Articles 18 and 21 TFEU may similarly be relied on against all private entities
that exercise “certain power over individuals” and are able “to impose on them
conditions”.27 The Court went on to examine the compatibility of the rule with
these provisions. It found that the difference in treatment between Mr Biffi and
a German national meant that Mr Biffi would be less able to integrate at his
sports club and, consequently, in his host State. As such, the Court concluded,
these rules constitute a restriction on the freedom of movement of EU citizens
within the meaning of Article 21 TFEU.28 The question then turned to the
issue of justifications and proportionality.
Whilst the Court reaffirmed that free movement restrictions related to
national competitions between national teams can be justified under EU law
due to their “particular nature and context”, this does not justify excluding
non-nationals from the “whole of a sporting activity”.29 In the current case, the
German Athletics Association argued that the public expects the national
champion of a given State to be a national of that State.30 This is based not only
on the issue of the national champion and highest placed athletes being
selected to represent Germany in international competitions, but also on the
basis that it is not possible to distinguish between the age categories and to
make rules for senior sport different to those applicable within other
categories, including within the elite category.
Considering the facts presented, the ECJ rejected both arguments. On the
question of selecting the national team, the Court found that the contested
rules meant that in the senior category, non-Germans could in fact represent
Germany. It transpired that it was only in the elite category that the German
AthleticsAssociation selects the best national athletes in order to participate in
international championships.31 Had the rules been applied consistently
between the two categories, one would have to conclude that the national team
justification would have been accepted. Naturally, this was also the downfall
for the second justification relied upon, namely the need to adopt the same
rules for all age categories.As with the first justification, it was clear that there
27. Ibid., paras. 37–40.
28. Ibid., para 47.
29. Ibid., para 49, citing Case C-415/93, Bosman, paras. 76 and 127. However, as the Court
points out, even for national competitions such restrictions must remain limited to their proper
objectives.
30. Judgement, para 51.
31. Ibid., para 56.
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was no such consistency in the rule’s application.32 Thus, the Court found that
the measure in question could not be justified.
The Court acknowledged that in sports with eliminatory heats, such as
athletics, the presence of non-nationals is capable of preventing a national
from winning the championship and of hindering the designation of the best
nationals.33 In such circumstances, it might be legitimate to limit the
participation of non-nationals, assuming there is no mechanism for the
participation of the non-national, such as participation in the early heats
and/or participating without classification. Should such a mechanism be
available, the total exclusion of that non-national would, according to the
Court, fail the proportionality test.34
Setting aside the specific circumstances presented in the case, the judgment
is clear authority for the proposition that Articles 18, 21 and 165 TFEU
preclude rules of a national sports association that restrict participation of
non-nationals in national sports championships unless those rules are justified
by objective considerations which are proportionate to the legitimate
objective pursued.
5. Comments
In TopFit the Court continues the expansion of the scope of EU law. Union
citizenship, the principle of non-discrimination and even the concept of access
to integration, as opposed to market access, are familiar elements of this
development. However, the particular circumstances in sports – a key
integration factor almost entirely governed by private actors – warranted
consideration and ultimately the expansion of the application of EU law to a
sphere that is both private and non-economic. While the special role of sports
in society allowed it to serve, yet again, as the arena for a general expansion of
the scope of EU law, the decision is also very particular to sports, which
occupies a special role in EU law and policy.
5.1. The scope of Union citizenship
TopFit is unusual, although not entirely unique, due to the classification of the
complainant as an amateur. Following Walrave and Koch, it has been widely
understood that amateur sport falls outside the scope of EU law due to the
absence of economic activity – the key trigger for the defence of free
32. Ibid., para 57.
33. Ibid., para 61.
34. Ibid., para 66.
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movement rights.35 In Deliège, an amateur judoka challenged selection rules
in her sport on the basis that they frustrated her provision of services.36 Ms
Deliège asserted, and the Court accepted, that economic activity was present
due to various grants and sponsorship agreements she had concluded.37
Therefore, inDeliège, the direct connection between the defence of EU rights
and the requirement to be carrying out direct economic activity was somewhat
eroded but essentially the link remains, albeit more indirectly.38
Like previous sports-related cases brought before the ECJ, the unique
conditions in sport caused the Court in TopFit to reconsider fundamental
questions regarding the scope and application of Union law. A first, and in
some regards most fundamental question addressed in TopFit, is whether the
rights of Union citizens give rise to legal obligations for private actors such as
the German Athletics Association.39 The brevity of the Court’s reasoning
suggests that a positive reply to that question is obvious,40 despite the
Advocate General’s advice to the contrary.41 It is established case law that
Treaty articles are capable of directly giving rise to legal obligations for
private actors that exercise State-like quasi-legislative powers, such as sports
governing bodies42 and trade unions.43 In retrospect, it turns out that we –
albeit understandably – took the ECJ’s repeated claim that “sport is subject to
Community law only in so far as it constitutes an economic activity”44 too
seriously and too literally.45
However, TopFit does not address the seemingly important difference
between Articles 18 and 21 TFEU and Treaty Articles previously recognized
as having horizontal direct effect: the latter pertain to “economic activity” and,
more specifically, guarantee the fundamental freedoms that serve as the basis
of the internal market.46 This begs the question to what extent arguments
35. Case C-36/74,Walrave and Koch, para 4.
36. It should be pointed out that Ms Deliège contested her amateur classification. See
Joined Cases C-51/96 & 191/97, Deliège, para 6.
37. Ibid., para 51.
38. This helps explain why the A.G.’s assessment included Art. 49 TFEU.
39. A distinction can and should be made between two types of horizontal direct effect: the
ability to invoke provisions of Union law against private entities that exercise quasi-legislative
powers (“quasi-horizontal” direct effect) and against all private entities (“full” horizontal direct
effect). The judgment in TopFit concerns and supports only the former.
40. Only two rather short paragraphs of the judgment, paras. 38 and 39, serve as a bridge
between existing case law on the horizontal direct effect of economic fundamental freedoms.
41. Opinion, paras. 99–101.
42. Case C-36/74,Walrave and Koch, paras. 17–21.
43. Case C-438/05, International Transport Workers’ Federation and Finnish Seamen’s
Union v. Viking Line ABP and OÜ Viking Line Eesti, EU:C:2007:772, paras. 34–37.
44. Case C-415/93, Bosman, para 73.
45. See e.g. Opinion, para 106, and Weatherill, op. cit. supra note 4, pp. 74–75.
46. Arts. 45, 49 and 56 TFEU.
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previously used to support horizontal direct effect for internal market rights
are applicable in a non-economic context.
The Court’s findings of horizontal direct effect have been based on the idea
of actor equivalence: private measures that serve the same function or have the
same effects as State measures ought to be subject to the Treaties to the same
extent.47 While this appears sensible, it requires further “unpacking” and a
closer examination reveals two, at least partially distinct arguments, for
horizontal direct effect.48 The first argument focuses on the uniform
application of Union law between Member States: if some Member States
regulate a particular matter and others leave it to private actors to provide the
regulation, the uniformity of Union law would be severely weakened if the
Treaties applied only to the former and not to the latter.49 While the uniformity
argument as such makes intuitive sense, the ECJ sensibly did not raise it in
support of its conclusion in TopFit; unlike in the case with for example
minimum wages50 there is no clear risk of inequitable application of Union
law between Member States with regard to appointing amateur champions.
In TopFit, the Court instead relied on the effectiveness argument: the
Union’s objectives and correlating individual rights would be adversely
affected if powerful private “collective regulators” are not bound by the
Treaties.51 The effectiveness argument makes good sense. It would be
untenable if Member States were able to circumvent their obligations under
Union law by actively or passively delegating regulatory functions to private
entities. However, effectiveness is not an end in and of itself,52 and it is not
always easy to distinguish between “collective regulation” and “true”
agreements between private actors.53 Simply put, how do we know if a private
measure has such qualities that it is comparable to a State measure?
The Court’s focus on collective regulation54 has held off the adoption of
“full” horizontal direct effect.55 However, with TopFit the Court ventures into
47. Barnard, The Substantive Law of the EU, 5th ed. (OUP, 2016), p. 233.
48. Van den Bogaert, “Horizontality: The Court attacks?” in Barnard and Scott (Eds.), The
Law of the Single European Market: Unpacking the Premises (Hart Publishing, 2002),
pp. 123–152, at p. 125.
49. See e.g. Case C-36/74 Walrave and Koch, para 19, and Case C-438/05, Viking Line,
para 34.
50. Case C-341/05, Laval un Partneri Ltd v. Svenska Byggnadsarbetareförbundet, Svenska
Byggnadsarbetareförbundets avdelning 1, Byggettan and Svenska Elektrikerförbundet,
EU:C:2007:809.
51. Judgment, paras. 38–40.
52. Van den Bogaert, op. cit. supra note 48, 136.
53. See e.g. Case C-159/00, Sapod Audic v. Eco-Emballages SA, EU:C:2002:343, para 74.
54. As seen in the case law referenced in judgment, paras. 38–40.
55. The only major exceptions being Case C-43/75, Defrenne v. Sabena, EU:C:2008:425,
and Case C-281/98, Angonese v. Cassa di Risparmio di Bolzano SpA, EU:C:2000:296.
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unfamiliar territory.The market access model assists the determination in hard
cases regarding free movement connected to the internal market: the private
actor’s capacity of hindering access to the relevant market helps determine
whether the Treaties apply to the actor.56 However, this approach offers little
or no support in situations like TopFit concerning access to integration rather
than access to a market,57 and the decision offers little guidance on this matter.
For example, do political parties, the Scouting Movement and religious
organizations play such a role in societal integration that they belong to the
class of actors that have obligations under the Treaties? Although TopFit
focuses specifically on sport and its specific role under EU law, the ECJ’s
reasoning on horizontal direct effect does not indicate that other types of
groups and organizations are necessarily exempt. We foresee the need for the
Court to clarify this matter.
5.2. The expanding scope of application of the Treaties
The decision to give Article 21 TFEU horizontal direct effect calls for a
re-examination of previous ECJ case law. Although the Treaties have always
contained a prohibition against discrimination on grounds of nationality, it
only applies in situations that fall within the “scope of application of the
Treaties”,58 and the ECJ has recognized and developed alternative tests to
determine whether a situation falls within the Treaties’ scope.59 Previous
sports-related free movement cases before the ECJ have rested on the presence
of an economic activity that places the situation within the scope of the
internal market, and, as such, protection against discrimination as part of the
right to free movement. Such cases have therefore involved a determination of
whether the athletes in question were professional or semi-professional.60 By
allowing athletes to invoke the fundamental right against discrimination on
grounds of nationality through Article 21 this question is largely irrelevant
after TopFit. For example, even if they were not “economically active”, Bruno
Walrave and Longinus Koch could today invoke Article 21 to challenge the
pacemaker nationality rules, as could Jean-Marc Bosman with regard to the
so-called “3+2 Rule”.
56. See e.g. Case C-171/11, Fra.bo SpA v. Deutsche Vereinigung des Gas- und
Wasserfaches eV (DVGW) —Technisch-Wissenschaftlicher Verein, EU:C:2012:453.
57. Judgment, para 33.
58. Art. 18 TFEU. See also Case C-186/87, Cowan v. Trésor public, EU:C:1989:47, para
17.
59. Derlén and Lindholm, “Three ideas: The scope of EU law protecting against
discrimination” in Derlén and Lindholm (Eds.), Volume in Honor of Pär Hallström (Iustus,
2012), pp. 77–100.
60. Case C-13/76, Donà v. Mantero, EU:C:1976:115, para 12; Case C-415/93, Bosman,
paras. 73–75 and Joined Cases C-51/96 & 191/97, Deliège, paras. 43–59.
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Although in this regard TopFit constitutes a clear and important
development compared to previous case law, it has been clear for some time
that the protection against non-discrimination on grounds of nationality
enjoys a particularly strong position under EU law, involving an
extraordinarily far-reaching ability to invoke such protection against private
entities. Almost two decades ago, the ECJ recognized in Angonese that the
right to not be (directly) discriminated against on grounds of nationality can be
invoked by “economically active” citizens against other private entities,
including those not exercising State-like regulatory powers.61 The protection
against discrimination under EU law has been significantly strengthened
through the adoption of legislative acts62 and the EU Charter.63 These
measures paved way for the ECJ to recognize the prohibition of discrimination
on other grounds as a general principle that employees may invoke directly
against employers.64 With this development in mind, the fundamental right to
non-discrimination was, in retrospect, a likely subject for an expansion of the
horizontal direct effect of EU law.65
However, there is nothing in TopFit that suggests that the negative
obligations of sports governing bodies and other similarly powerful private
actors are limited to direct discrimination on national grounds. On the
contrary, the Court’s finding that these actors are subject to Article 21 TFEU
contains no reservations.66 It is clear from ECJ case law that Article 21 has a
broad scope and captures any unequal treatment “that is liable to affect the
freedom of nationals of other Member States to move within the European
61. Case C-281/98, Angonese, para 36, confirmed in Case C-94/07, Raccanelli v.
Max-Planck-Gesellschaft zur Förderung der Wissenschaften eV., EU:C:2008:425, para 45.
62. E.g. Council Directive 2000/78/EC of 27 Nov. 2000 establishing a general framework
for equal treatment in employment and occupation, O.J. 2000, L 303/16–22, granting stronger
protection of economically active non-movers.
63. In particular, Art. 21 contains a general protection against discrimination on various
grounds.
64. See e.g. Case C-144/04, Mangold v. Helm, EU:C:2005:709; Case C-555/07,
Kucucdevici v. Swedex GmbH&Co. KG., EU:C:2010:21; Case C-441/14,Dansk Industri (DI),
acting on behalf of Ajos A/S v. Estate of Rasmussen, EU:C:2016:278; Case C-414/16,
Egenberger v. Evangelisches Werk für Diakonie und Entwicklung e.V., EU:C:2018:257; Joined
Cases C-569 & 570/16, Stadt Wuppertal v. Bauer andWillmeroth v. Broßonn, EU:C:2018:871;
and Case C-68/17, IR v. JQ, EU:C:2018:696.
65. In this context it can be noted that ECJ case law on the horizontal application of the
fundamental right against non-discrimination after TopFit leaves out one group of EU citizens,
i.e. non-economically active citizens seeking to invoke the fundamental right against a private
entity that lacks State-like regulatory powers. It remains to be seen if the Court will
subsequently extend its protection to this group.
66. Judgment, para 40.
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Union”.67 Moreover, in TopFit the ECJ explicitly declared that horizontal
direct effect extends to all measures that “adversely affect the exercise of the
fundamental freedoms”,68 a phrase that in the Court’s language includes all
types of obstacles, including those that are non-discriminatory. Finally, the
Court examined the measure in question using a broad market-access-like
standard rather than a strict direct discrimination standard.69 In TopFit, the
ECJ generously connects the exercise of free movement, interest in amateur
sports, integration at a particular club, and integration in society more
generally, thereby indicating that Union citizens can invoke Article 21 TFEU
to challenge any private measure that makes it less attractive for them to
exercise their free movement rights, and this includes non-discriminatory
obstacles. Thus, private actors who may be subject to Article 21 TFEU should
not feel secure that they are in compliance with the requirements of EU law
just because they do not engage in direct discrimination on the grounds of
nationality.
5.3. The relationship between EU law and sports
5.3.1. The demise of the sporting exception
InWalrave and Koch, a case concerning alleged nationality discrimination in
motor-paced cycling, the Court declared that sport was subject to EU law
“only in so far as it constitutes an economic activity”, and that the prohibition
on nationality discrimination “does not affect the composition of sport teams,
in particular national teams, the formation of which is a question of purely
sporting interest and as such has nothing to do with economic activity”.70
Taken together, paragraphs 4 and 8 have been interpreted as giving rise to the
so-called “sporting exception” in European law.71 In Bosman, the scope of the
sporting exception was narrowed by the ECJ, as it rejected pleas based on the
sporting exception to exclude from the reach of the Treaty the system of
demanding payment for a player who had reached the end of his contract and
the use of nationality quotas in European club football.72 InBosman, the Court
did, however, recognize as legitimate the pursuit of certain sporting objectives
that could be used to justify restrictions on freedom of movement for workers.
These included “the aims of maintaining a balance between clubs by
67. See e.g. Case C-182/15, Petruhhin, EU:C:2016:630, paras. 32–33; Case C-247/17,
Raugevicius, EU:C:2018:898, paras. 28–30; Case C-191/16, Pisciotti v. Germany, EU:C:
2018:222, para 45.
68. Judgment, para 39.
69. Ibid., paras. 44–47.
70. Case C-36/74,Walrave and Koch, paras. 4 and 8.
71. For comprehensive treatment see Parrish and Miettinen, op. cit. supra note 4.
72. Case C-415/93, Bosman.
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preserving a certain degree of equality and uncertainty as to results and of
encouraging the recruitment and training of young players”.73
In Meca-Medina, the Court severely curtailed the reach of the sporting
exception by finding that “the mere fact that a rule is purely sporting in nature
does not have the effect of removing from the scope of the Treaty the person
engaging in the activity governed by that rule or the body which has laid it
down”.74 The Court did, nevertheless, recognize that some rules are “inherent
in the organization and proper conduct of competitive sport”.75 Although the
Court, in this case, was referring to how doping rules are inherent in the
pursuit of clean sport, it has not been foreclosed that certain nationality
restrictions in sport could fall within this category. Since Meca-Medina,
European sport has had to adjust to a new legal reality in which purely
sporting rules are no longer removed from the scope of the Treaty.
Meca-Medina therefore fatally damaged paragraph 8 of Walrave and Koch
and in doing so castrated half of the so-called sporting exception in EU law.
The other half, the paragraph 4 reference to economic activity, has survived –
until now. In his Opinion, Advocate General Tanchev referred to paragraph 4
ofWalrave andKoch as containing the “cardinal rule” that sport is only subject
to EU law whenever practised as an economic activity, and that the sports
sector “organized their affairs” on this basis and took comfort from that
cardinal rule being repeated in all sports-related cases since.76 The
development of citizenship rights, which are not dependent on the exercise of
economic activity, has placed a strain on the cardinal rule.
5.3.2. EU sports policy comes of age
The EU’s sports policy is, to a large extent, a creature of arguably the most
prominent EU sports law case – Bosman. Since then, through a series of
Commission and Parliament reports and studies, the EU has sought, amongst
other things, to promote a wider understanding of the specificity of sport and
outline the social significance of sport.77 However, without a constitutional
footing in the Treaty, such activity was limited and EU action in sport
continued to be guided by the ECJ case law and the decisional practice of the
Commission.
The adoption of Article 165 TFEU was a potential turning point, as the
Treaty now made explicit reference to the “specific nature of sport” and “its
73. Ibid., para 106.
74. Case C-519/04 P,Meca-Medina, para 27.
75. Ibid., para 45.
76. Opinion, para 106.
77. For a discussion on the development of EU sports policy see Parrish, “Sources and
origins of EU sports policy” in Anderson et al., Research Handbook on EU Sports Law and
Policy (Edward Elgar, 2018).
Case C-22/18 13
social and educational function”. However, for these statements to have
practical meaning within the world of sport required both a maturation of EU
sports policy and its judicial recognition. With TopFit, EU sports policy has
finally come of age. TopFit represents its judicial recognition (a form of
positive integration) and a juridification of the social dimension of sport in
which essentially private areas of activity, such as the organization of amateur
sport, have become subject to public or judicial scrutiny (a form of negative
integration).78 These points are amplified by a brief assessment of EU
engagement in this area. The EU has long stressed the social, as well as the
economic, importance of sport. In Bosman, the Court stressed “the
considerable social importance of sporting activities” in the EU.79 Shortly
afterwards, the 1997 Amsterdam Declaration on Sport emphasized “the social
significance of sport, in particular its role in forging identity and bringing
people together … In this connection, special consideration should be given
to the particular characteristics of amateur sport”.80 Advocate General
Tanchev dismissed this statement as “merely” recognizing the social
importance of sport and lacking “binding legal force”.81
The 2000 Nice Declaration stressed the “specific characteristics of sport
and its social function in Europe, of which account should be taken in
implementing common policies” and the importance of sport for integration
and involvement in social life.82 In both the 2007 White Paper on Sport and the
2011 Communication on Sport, the Commission dedicated chapters to the
“Societal role of sport” in which it once again stressed the value of sport for
“social inclusion, integration and equal opportunities”.83 The White Paper
stated that “[s]port makes an important contribution to economic and social
cohesion and more integrated societies” and that “[a]ll residents should have
access to sport”,84 and went on to state that “membership of sports clubs and
participation in competitions are relevant factors to promote the integration of
residents into the society of the host country” and that Member States and
78. For a discussion of juridification in the context of sport see Foster, “Developments in
sporting law” in Allison (Ed.), The Changing Politics of Sport (Manchester University Press,
1993) and Gardiner et al. (Eds.), Sports Law (Routledge, 2012), pp. 73–77.
79. Case C-415/93, Bosman, para 106.
80. Declaration 29 to the Treaty of Amsterdam.
81. Opinion, para 108.
82. Nice European Council: Conclusion of the Presidency, “Declaration on the specific
characteristics of sport and its social function, of which account should be taken in
implementing common policies”, 7–10 Dec. 2000.
83. Commission Communication cited supra note 1, Ch. 2, and Commission
Communication, “Developing the European dimension in sport”, COM(2011)12 final, Ch. 2.
84. Commission Communication, cited supra note 1, section 2.5. In the view of A.G.
Tanchev, the White Paper was “light on detail and deferential to the role of governing bodies in
sport”, Opinion para 108.
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sports organizations should “address discrimination based on nationality in all
sports”.85 In the accompanying background paper, the Commission
forthrightly stated that “[a]mateur sport must not remain outside the scope of
the fundamental principles of free movement”.86
The Member States confirmed the importance of sport in society when in
2010 the Council published conclusions on the role of sport as a source of and
driver for active social inclusion.87 In the Conclusions, the Council
highlighted that “sport holds an important place in the lives of many EU
citizens and plays a strong societal role with a powerful potential for social
inclusion in and through sport, meaning that participation in sport or in
physical activity in many different ways contributes to inclusion into society”.
The Commission has sought to give practical effect to these sentiments. In
a complaint regarding nationality restrictions in amateur football in Spain, it
expressed concern that a worker’s right to be joined by their family in the host
country, and the integration of that family into their new surroundings, may be
undermined by rules such as those adopted by the Spanish Football Federation
prohibiting the issuing of amateur licences to non-Spanish nationals.88
Furthermore, in a response to a question asked by a private party, the
Commission argued that:
“following a combined reading of Articles 18, 21 and 165 of the Treaty on
the Functioning of the European Union, the general EU principle of
prohibition of any discrimination on grounds of nationality applies for all
EU citizens who have used their right to free movement. This principle
concerns amateur sport as well as professional sport … the Commission
considers that the practice of amateur sport constitutes a social
advantage …”.89
Thus, more than a decade before TopFit, the Commission was moving in the
same direction.
Article 165 TFEU recognizes sport’s “social and educational function”
whilst stating that EU action is to be directed at “developing the European
dimension in sport, by promoting fairness and openness in sporting
85. Ibid., section 4.2.
86. European Commission, “Commission staff working document – The EU and sport:
Background and context – Accompanying document to the white paper on sport,
COM(2007)391 final”, 11 July 2007, section 4.2.1.
87. Council of the European Union, Council conclusions of 18 Nov. 2010 on the role of
sport as a source of and a driver for social inclusion, O.J. 2010, C 326/04.
88. Commission Press Release, IP/04/1222.
89. Details of the letter have been published in Engelbrecht, “Discrimination against EU
nationals in amateur sports”, (2010) International Sports Law Journal, 105–106.
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competitions”. Reference to the “social” function of sport and “openness in
sporting competitions” reflects the trajectory of thinking concerning the role
of sport in society expressed by the EU institutions described above. It also
aligns with some academic thinking that has argued that sport’s relationship
with the Treaty should extend beyond the confines of the economic aspects of
sport.90 Article 165 has also acted as the legal basis for the adoption of a
number of EU Work Plans on Sport that have continued the theme of
connecting sport with EU social goals.91 The 2017–2020 Work Plan gives
priority to “[s]port in society, particularly social inclusion”.92 TopFit absorbs
these concerns and in doing so marks the most significant judicial validation
of EU sports policy to date.
TopFit also adds some clarity on the question of whether Article 165 has
horizontal reach into other Treaty provisions. Prior to TopFit, this debate had
focused on the significance of its reference to the “specific nature of sport”. In
other words, does Article 165 require or merely invite the Court and
Commission to take account of sport’s specific nature in the exercise of other
Treaty functions. The ECJ’s case law did not, until TopFit, greatly advance
this debate. In its assessment of training compensation schemes in football,
the Court, in Bernard, found that the existence of Article 165 “corroborated”
its finding that the restrictive effects of such schemes can be justified with
reference to the proportionate pursuit of legitimate sporting objectives.93 In
QC Leisure the Court merely “noted” the existence of Article 165.94 TopFit
reveals a more explicit willingness on the part of the Court to read Article 165
horizontally into other Treaty provisions – in this instance Articles 18 and
21,95 and its existence seems central to why the Court decided to deviate from
the orthodoxy of only permitting direct nationality discrimination to be
justified with reference to the express Treaty derogations.
90. See e.g. Van den Bogaert, op. cit. supra note 4; Study cited supra note 2; Parrish,
annotation of Case 36/74 Walrave and Koch, in Anderson (Ed.), Landmark Cases and
Decisions in Sports Law (T.M.C. Asser Press, 2012).
91. Resolution of the Council and of the representatives of the governments of the Member
States, meeting within the Council, on a European Union work plan for sport for 2011–2014,
O.J. 2011, C 162/01; 2014–2017, O.J. 2014, C 183/03, and 2017–2020, doc. 9639/17.
92. Resolution on a European Union work plan for sport for 2017–2020, cited supra note
91, at p. 6.
93. Case C-325/08, Olympique Lyonnais v. Olivier Bernard, Newcastle United, EU:C:
2010:143, para 40.
94. Joined Cases C-403 & 429/08, Football Association Premier League Ltd and Others v.
QC Leisure (Case C-403/08) and Murphy v. Media Protection Services Ltd (Case C-429/08),
EU:C:2011:631, para 101.
95. Judgment, para 34: “It is therefore clear from Article 21(1) TFEU, read in conjunction
with Article 165 TFEU”.
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5.4. Crafting a new sporting exception: Justifying nationality
discrimination
Through its interpretation of the words “social function” of sport and
“openness” in sporting competitions contained in Article 165, TopFit opens a
new dimension in EU sports law by connecting amateur sporting practices to
the Treaty. The juridification of these practices, whilst very significant and no
doubt quite baffling to sports bodies should not, however, be considered a
“transformative” development, as it merely represents the next logical stage in
the teleology of EU sports law and policy described above.96 In light of the
above legal and policy developments, it should have come as no surprise that
this was the direction of travel.
Nevertheless, the reference to the word “openness” in TopFit does merit
attention. Article 165’s reference to “openness” always posed a potential
threat to sports bodies, particularly if, as in TopFit, it was interpreted by the
Court to require, in principle at least, open access to sports competitions.97
Genuine open access to sporting competitions would drive a wedge into the
European model of sport and its implications are, potentially, far-reaching. For
example, within professional sport, one could conceive that “openness” could
be cited by professional clubs wanting to relocate across borders without
impediment. This could transform the sporting landscape in Europe in a way
that the liberalization of the player market did following Bosman.98
Open access is feared by many, but not all, sports bodies across Europe. The
2010 Commission study on discrimination against non-nationals in individual
sports competitions collected evidence from sports bodies as to why
restricting the participation of non-nationals is important.99 These included:
the desire of national sports bodies and sponsors to fund national athletes; the
need to prepare for national representative events and to identify the best
national athletes; the need to nurture and give opportunities to young national
athletes; the need to ensure integrity, fairness and competitive balance in
sport; the need to preserve the national character of national championships;
the desire of the public to identify with national athletes and stay engaged in
the sport; the need to avoid a situation in which one nationality dominates
96. Commenting on Art. 165 TFEU prior to TopFit, Weatherill argued that the effect of Art.
165 TFEU “should not be regarded as transformative”. See Weatherill, op. cit. supra note 4,
p. 161.
97. For a discussion see Weatherill, “Fairness, openness and the specific nature of sport:
Does the Lisbon Treaty change EU sports law?”, (2010) International Sports Law Journal,
11–17.
98. See e.g. Duval and Van Rompuy, op. cit. supra note 4.
99. Commission Communication cited supra note 2, Ch. 5.
Case C-22/18 17
many national championships; and the need to retain media interest in the
sport. It should be noted that not all of the above have been accepted, or
rejected, by the Court of Justice as amounting to legitimate sporting
objectives.
In light of the above, it is to be expected that TopFit will raise fears of an
organizational revolution in sport; brought about by opening access to
sporting competitions and diluting the purity of national competition.
However TopFit actually dampens such talk, as the Court has acknowledged
that notwithstanding the directly discriminatory nature of the rule at issue,
sporting justifications, proportionately pursued, can be cited to restrict the
participation of non-nationals. Despite damage done to the sporting exception
by bothMeca-Medina (demise of purely sporting rules) and TopFit (severing
the economic activity nexus), all is not lost for those sports bodies wanting to
adopt rules designed to preserve sport’s national character.
In TopFit, the ECJ, using a similar construction each time, repeated a line of
reasoning expressed in its sporting case law to the effect that the provisions of
EU law concerning the free movement of persons and services, do not
preclude rules or practices justified on (non-economic) grounds which relate
to the particular nature and context of certain sports matches, such as matches
between national teams from different countries, as long as such a restriction
on the scope of the provisions in question remains limited to its proper
objective and cannot be relied upon to exclude the whole of a sporting activity
from the scope of the Treaty.100 It is worth observing that in TopFit the above
bracketed reference to non-economic grounds was removed, reflecting the
difficulty in severing economic aspects from sporting considerations in
modern commercialized sport. It should also be noted that the reference to
“matches between national teams from different countries” is cited as an
example, implying that justifications can also relate to other sporting contexts,
such as eligibility for national championships.
Sports bodies can also rely on the inherent rules approach. In Deliège, the
ECJ took a different path from that outlined above, by finding that selection
rules do not constitute a restriction on the freedom to provide services on the
grounds that they were inherent in the conduct of an international high-level
sports event.101 The inherent rules logic, which was subsequently repeated in
Meca-Medina, can reasonably be used in a non-economic context and whilst
neither case concerned nationality discrimination, it must remain a possibility
that in future, sporting rules and practices based on direct nationality
100. See Case C-415/93, Bosman, paras. 76 and 127; Joined Cases C-51/96 & 191/97,
Deliège, para 43; Case C-519/04,Meca-Medina, para 26 and judgment, para 49.
101. Joined Cases C-51/96 & 191/97, Deliège, para 64.
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discrimination could find shelter under this doctrine, as recommended by the
2010 Commission funded study.102
Elsewhere, the Court has adopted a more standard restriction/objective
justification test when reviewing international transfer regulations governing
the payment of transfer fees, the use of transfer windows, and the operation of
training compensation schemes in sport; all of which, once again, did not
involve allegations of direct nationality discrimination.103
An orthodox approach suggests that the type of direct nationality
discrimination experienced by Mr Biffi can only be justified with reference to
the express Treaty derogations of public policy, public security and public
health.104 But TopFit confirmed that sport has carved out of this orthodoxy a
more generous justificatory regime in which sporting justifications for
directly discriminatory measures, unrelated to the express Treaty derogations,
can be relied on. Apart fromWalrave and Koch, the only other example of the
Court considering direct nationality discrimination in the sporting context
came with its examination of the “3+2 rule” in Bosman. But here, the Court
declined to classify the rule as directly discriminatory and rather referred to
the system as giving rise to an obstacle to free movement which could, in
theory, be justified. The grounds for such justification were then dismissed,
but were at least aired.105
In Mr Biffi’s case, the Court identified differential treatment “on account of
his nationality”106 implying an analysis based on direct nationality
discrimination. But the Court went on to examine traditional sporting
justifications and not those expressly cited in the Treaty. In doing so, the Court
stated that “as has been held with regard to the composition of national teams,
it appears to be legitimate to limit the award of the title of national champion
in a particular sporting discipline to a national of the relevant Member State
and consider that nationality requirement to be a characteristic of the title of
102. Comission Communication cited supra note 2, Ch. 6.
103. Case C-415/93, Bosman; Case C-176/96, Lehtonen and Castors Canada Dry
Namur-Braine ASBL v. Fédération royale belge des sociétés de basket-ball (FRBSB), EU:C:
2000:201, and Case C-325/08,Olympique Lyonnais. For general authority on this standard test,
see Case C-55/94, Gebhard v. Consiglio dell’Ordine degli Avvocati e Procuratori di Milano,
EU:C:1995:411.
104. Art. 45(3) TFEU. Barnard refers to this “orthodoxy” although she does acknowledge
that “there have been signs that the Court is contemplating a move towards allowing distinctly
applicable measures to be justified not only by the express derogations but also by the judicially
developed ‘public-interest requirements’”. See Barnard, op. cit. supra note 47, p. 218.
105. Although it is conceivable that the Court did not concern itself with the legal concept
of nationality, but with that of sporting nationality. If true, sporting nationality clauses could
indeed be considered indirectly discriminatory and subject to the orthodox justificatory regime.
See Weatherill, op cit. supra note 4, p. 193 and Van den Bogaert, op cit. supra note 4, p. 155.
106. Judgment, para 43.
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national champion itself ”.107 It went on to offer some justificatory guidance
to sports bodies by acknowledging that in sports with eliminatory heats, such
as athletics, the presence of non-nationals is capable of preventing a national
from winning the championship and of hindering the designation of the best
nationals.108
TopFit therefore represents an opportunity for sports bodies to craft a new
sporting exception based on the overriding requirement in the general interest
to preserve the national character, identity, purity, public confidence in and
cultural significance of national sporting competitions. These, and related
justifications, fall outside the express Treaty derogations and thus offer sports
bodies greater opportunities to justify rules and practices that discriminate
directly on the grounds of nationality, subject of course to proportionality
review. In that regard, the existence of legitimate sporting objectives will not
necessarily be sufficient to justify a complete ban on the participation of
non-nationals. In crafting this new sporting exception, sports bodies are
advised to apply them consistently, proportionately and to connect these
objective justifications to Article 165 TFEU which can act as the source of a
Treaty-based derogation from the orthodox approach.109
This analysis might embolden some sports administrators to devise new
rules, or rethink old ones, motivated by a desire to exclude foreigners from
some sporting competitions. For example, in 2008 FIFA recommended, but
then withdrew, a proposal to introduce a “6+5 rule” in football in which six
players in a team had to be eligible to represent the national team of the
association in which the club was located. The challenge of connecting
justifications to the orthodox express Treaty derogations no doubt influenced
FIFA’s decision to withdraw it. UEFA, by contrast, crafted an alternative
measure – the Locally Trained Players rule – that scrupulously avoided
reference to direct nationality discrimination within the eligibility criteria,
thereby opening up potential justifications outside the confines of the Treaty
derogations, should a challenge be brought on the basis of indirect nationality
discrimination.110
107. Ibid., para 50.
108. Ibid., para 61.
109. An important question is to what extent private actors, such as sports governing
bodies, can invoke general interest objectives, such as protecting consumer interests, the
environment or preventing social dumping, to justify their measures. See e.g. Case C-438/05,
Viking Line and Case C-171/11, Fra.bo SpA. This is a difficult question not clearly answered in
ECJ case law. On the one hand, private actions should be motivated by private interests – it is not
the role of private actors to set public interest. On the other hand, limiting the aims that private
actors can invoke to justify their measures would mean that their obligations under Union law
are effectively greater than the Member States’ – even though the former are its creators and
main subjects.
110. Downward et al., “An assessment of the compatibility of UEFA’s home-grown player
rule with Article 45 TFEU”, (2014) EL Rev., 493–510.
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6. Conclusion
In TopFit, the ECJ took the “significant constitutional step” of making private
actors subject to the obligations that come with Union citizenship,111
uncoupling horizontal direct effect of the Treaty from the economic activity
paradigm of the internal market that has governed it since the start.112 Once
again, sport has served as a vehicle for the development of the scope of Union
law.At the same time,TopFit can comfortably sit alongside Walrave andKoch,
Bosman andMeca-Medina as a key case in EU sports law. It further challenges
the “cardinal rule” enshrined in Walrave and Koch and subsequent
sports-related case law, it gives judicial validation to the trajectory of EU
sports policy, it advances our understanding of the horizontal reach of Article
165 into other Treaty competences, and it opens up new judicial opportunities
for sports bodies to seek to justify directly discriminatory rules and practices.
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